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November 11, 1983 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 83-490 
DAVIS, et al. 
v. 
SCHERER 
L, CUom CA 11 
~~ Johnson, Hatchett) 
~ 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appts contend that the DC wrongly denied 
them good faith immunity on the basis of their violation of state 
"' ' .. 
' '' 
,, 
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regulations and declared unconstitutional a statute whose valid-
ity was not placed in issue by this suit. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Appee worked as a radio 
operator for the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP). He decided to 
supplement his income by working as well for the Escambia County 
Sheriff's Office. He applied for permission to do so, which was 
granted by a memorandum which specifying that the permission 
could be rescinded should the employment interfere with appee's 
duties in the Patrol. 
Shortly thereafter, permission was rescinded, and appee 
was ordered to quit his second job. Officers in the FHP central 
headquarters apparently felt that appee might be subpoenaed in 
the connection with his duties for the sheriff's office, thus 
interfering with his duties at the Patrol. Appee's immediate 
superiors did not explain this reason to him. He refused to quit 
the second job, explaining that he had already invested in uni-
forms and a pistol for the sheriff's job and that he saw no con-
flict between the two jobs. The exchanges between appee and his 
superiors were embodied in a series of letters which were re-
ferred to one of appts, director of the FHP. He ordered appee's 
~mployment terminated. 
Appee appealed his dismissal to the Florida Career Serv-
ice Commission, claiming that his dismissal was without jus~ 
cause not pursuant to a rule validly adopted by the department. 
Five months later, appee filed a second petition challenging the 
FHP policy on dual employment. The Commission declared the poli-
cy invalid as applied to appee. The Commission then informed 
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petr that his appeal would be heard, ten months after the dis-
missal. Before the hearing, the department and appee agreed that 
appee would be reinstated and receive 
month~ resigned, claiming that 
~ 
returning to work. 
partial backpay. Six 
he had been harrassed after 
Appee then filed a section 1983 action in DC, contending 
that his discharge violated the fourteenth amendment and request-
ing additional backpay, compensatory and exemplary damages, and a 
declaraton that Florida's statute governing pre- and post-
termination hearings was unconstitutional. 
The DC entered judgment for appee. It concluded that 
under Florida law appee had a property interest in his job pro- ~ 
tected by the fourteenth amendment. The court found that petr 
had received no pretermination hearing: hjl had been given no 
explanation of the reasons for termination and no opportunity 
prior to termination to dispute whether his outside employment 
conflicted with his duties at the FHP or constituted adequate 
cause for dismissal. Nor did appee receive a post-deprivation 
hearing sufficiently prompt to remedy the failure to provide a 
pre-termination hearing. 
Further, the DC found unconstitutional section 110.061, 
~ 
Florida Statutes (1977), because the statue contained no require-
A 
ment for a pretermination hearing or for a sufficiently prompt 
post-termination hearing. 
Finally, the DC rejected appts' qualified immunity de-
fense. The court found that appts had violated appee's clearly 
7 
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established constitutional rights. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 
u.s. 308, 322 (1975). 
On rehearing, the DC found that at the time of appee's 
discharge it was not clearly established that Florida state em-
ployees had a property interest in their job. However, the DC 
noted that appts had violated the FHP personnel rules, which re-
quire a written report, including a written statement from the 
employee and a statement of reasons for discharge, before termi-
nation of employment. The court concluded that violation of clear 
state law was sufficient to deprive appts of immunity. Williams 
v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1982). 
The DC also noted on rehearing that Florida had amended 
Chapter 110 to provide constitutionally sufficient pre-----termination procedures. It therefore modified its order to in-
validate Chapter 110 and its implementing rules "insofar as they 
fail to provide a prompt post-termination hearing." 
The CA affirme~~~t of the DC opinion. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) The DC lacked jurisdiction to de-
clare the Florida statute unconstitutional. Chapter 110 as it 
currently stands had not even been promulgated at the time appee 
was discharged, and so was not applied to appee. The DC should 
have upheld the statute by construing it to require a hearing in 
a reasonable time. In any case, the DC decision leaves the Flor-
ida Career Service Commission in confusion because the opinion 
does not specify how promptly hearings must be held to satisfy 
the Constitution. 
( 
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The statute in effect at the time of appee's termination 
was validly applied to appee. A ninth month delay does not ren-
der the statute constitutionally infirm, because the delay does 
not prevent the state from fully compensating wronged employees. 
The case is thus distinguishable from Barry v. Barchi, 443 u.s. 
55 (1979), where the delay worked irreparable harm on the ag-
grieved licensee. 
(2) State officials do not lose qualified immunity upon 
a showing that they violated clear state law, provided that they 
acted with subjective good faith and did not violate clear feder-
al constitutional principles. The relevant decisions of this 
court are framed in terms of whether the constitutional right 
allegedly infringed was clearly established. E.g., Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, 562 (1977); Wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 
308, 321-322 (1975). The DC's reasoning is unsound because ex-
pansion of liability will chill officials' performance of their 
lawful duties. Further, the DC's holding creates incentives for 
states to avoid formulating administrative rules to protect con-
stitutional rights, because those rules will be a predicate for 
liability even when the constitutional rights are unclear. 
Resp: (1) Appee raises his challenge to the invalidation 
of Chapter 110 for the first time before this Court. Before the 
CA, appee conceded that the wording of the new statute was "sub-
stantially the same" as that of the old. Further, the delay of 
ten months in the present case was clearly unreasonable. 
(2) A state official who violates state law is stripped 
of his qualified immunity. The language of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
( 
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102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982), refers broadly to violations of statutory 
as well as constitutional law, and the holding below is consist-
ent with prior CA cases. Williams v. Treat, 671 F.2d 892, 901 
(5th Cir. 1982); King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 
1983). 
Further, the DC's holding does not call into question 
the validity of a state statute and so should not be considered 
on appeal. 
4. DISCUSSION: (1) The DC found that the Florida 
statute had been amended to provide a constitutionally sufficient 
pre-termination hearing. On that basis, an additional prompt 
post-termination might not be required. The DC's declaratory 
judgment dependea upon an evaluation of Florida employment proce-
dures as a whole, and to that extent the controversy became moot 
when Florida amended a ~ajor component of those procedures. The 
DC judgment was clearly in error on this point, and summary re-
-
versal might be appropriate. The DC was extraordinarily casual 
in its willingness to invalidate a large portion of Florida ad-
ministrative procedure. 
However, the passage from appt's brief before theCA, 
quoted by appee at Motion to Dismiss or Deny, at 14-15, does sug-
gest that appt might have conceded this point before the CA. I 
would call for the record to ascertain whether appt made this 
concession. 
(2) The DC's ruling on qualified immunity is not well 
supported in this Court's cases, which, as appt observes, gener-
ally seem to assume that the "objective" portion of the good 
No. 83-490 page 7. 
faith immunity test refers to whether the constitutional or stat-
utory right alleged to have been violated was clearly established 
at the time of the violation. Here, the DC did not find that the 
administrative rulings which made appts' conduct clearly illegal 
conferred any actionable right upon appee. 
h / .... h h .c-7 However, t e CA 11 rule 1s not 1ncons1stent w1t t e ~ 
J 
underlying rationale for qualified immunity. If qualified immu-
nity is designed to avoid chilling official performance of lawful 
duties, then nothing is lost by withholding immunity from offi-
cials for actions clearly illegal under state law. Further, it 
is not clear how much the rule actually expands official liabil-
ity, for state law requirements will often create property rights 
whose deprivation would be actionable under the fourteenth amend-
ment in any case. Finally, there is no conflict between the two 
circuits -- CA 1 and CA 11 -- that have so far considered the 
question. The appeal here should be treated as a petn for cert 
and, as such, denied. 
~
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFRecord. 
There is a response. 
November 1, 1983 Charny 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: David DA'T'E: April 6, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-490 Davis v. Scherer 
Attached is a copy of my rough memo to file. Un-
less you disagree with it, I will not need a bench memo. ., 
I may not have the procedural due process/Florida 
statute invalidation sequence accurately in mind. But you 




lfp/ss 04/13/84 DAVISl SALLY-POW 
83-490 Davis v. Scherer 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is an appeal from CAll that presents two 
issues. The case is a mess, and one we should not have -__.., 
noted. I voted to D&D it. 
In briefest summary, the appellee was a Florida 
employee who wanted to take a second "moonlighting" job. 
A controversy developed with his superiors, and in the end 
he resigned. The facts in this respect are confusing. 
Apparently he was fired from one of his jobs after he 
refused to give it up. He appealed his termination to the 
Florida Career Service Commission, but agreed to a 
settlement before a hearing was ever had. Appellee filed 
this §1983 suit in federal DC alleging denial or 
procedural due process in that no hearing was provided -----...... 
before termination of employment. 
'Ihe DC invalidated the Florida statutes 
providing termination proceedings (the 1975 statutes), but 
these were superseded by a 1981 revision of the relevant 
- -----'--- -
statutes a revision that occurred subsequent to 
appellee's termination. The District Court nevertheless 
; ,/ 
by an amended judgment, invalidated the 1981 statutes as 
well as those of 1977. 
The Attorney General of Florida, on behalf of 
appellants, argues rather persuasively that the DC had no 
authority to invalidate the 1981 statutes. There was no 
-·-
live controversy under them, and the case had become moot. 
Although I may not have the situation sorted out 
entirely accurately, I think we should vacate the 
decisions below that invalidated Florida statutes 
unnecessarily. X 
I thought we took this case, not to address the 
foregoing issue, but to consider the DC's denial of 
Jt .!.{_-
qualified immunity to the state officials. Even though 
the DC held that there was no "violation of any clearly 
established constitutional rule", appellants had acted in 
violation of Florida state statutes. This, according to 
the DC, was the equivalent of violating an established 
- J 
' federal constitutional right, and therefore good faith 
immunity was not available. Since CAll merely affirmed on 
the basis of the opinion below, we have no discussion of 
this issue by the Court of Appeals. 
The DC decided this case prior to our decision 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. Apart from that, however, the 
'· 
' . 
line of qualified immunity cases beginning with Pierson v. 
~make it perfectly clear that in an action under §1983 
the objective qualified immunity test applies only to the 
violation of a federal constitutional right. There is no 
authority for the DC's position that violation of a state 
statute is sufficient to deny good faith immunity. 
On this issue, I think Harlow is controlling. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 2, 1984 
RECEIVED 
CHAMBERS OF THE 
C H I E F . ..ILl :3 T I C [
.84 HAY -2 A10 :50 
Memorandum to the Chief Justice 
From Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
Thurgood has examined Davis v. Scherer, 
No. 83-490, and concluded that he probably 
cannot write in support of the reversal on the 
issue of qualified immunity. Accordingly, he 
is not transferring Berkemer v. McCarthy, 
No. 83-710, to Bill in exchange. 
Therefore, we feel that Davis v. Scherer 
should be assigned to someone other than either 
of us. Bill is willing to take anything that 
any other Justice in the majority to reverse 
Davis v. Scherer is willing to exchange. 
Sincerely, 
/ /1 
l i.. , . 
/ ) , . ( 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE May 2, 1984 








May 4, 1984 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to your letter of May 2 asking for a 
volunteer to take Davis v. Scherer 83-490 off of Bill Bren-
nan's hands in exchange for a case in which he is in the 
majority. 
As I understand no one has held up his or her 
"hand", I gingerly raise mine. It seems clear that Bill 
needs another case. I am reluctant to surrender one of the 
three cases you assigned to me as I am in a position to 
write all three of them before the June 1 target date. Also 
I have lost one case you assigned to me earlier. 
But I understand Bill's desire not to be left with 
only one case from the April arguments. Accordingly, I am 
glad to offer him 83-245/83-291 Pension Benefit Corp. v. 
Gray. 
I would prefer to retain the other two cases as-
signed me. But if Bill does not want to write Pension Bene-
fit, he may have Armco (83-297). 
Scherer is almost a •non-case•, but I will take it 
for a Per Curiam unless someone would like to write a Court 
opinion on it. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CH ... I41!1EAS OP' 
.tlUFmt.t Ql1tmi lff flrt ~b .Allah• 
:.uJringtcn. ~. <!1· 2Dp~~ 
.JUSTICE w ... ..I . BRENNAN, .JR. 
May 4, 1984 
Dear Chief, 
Lewis has been good enough to let 
me have Nos. 83-245 and 83-291, Pension 
Benefit Corp. v. Gray, etc., and I'm 
happy to have it. I assume that Davis 
v. Scherer, No. 83-490, in which Lewis 
has suggested writing a~ curiam, will 
be assigned to him. 
Sincerely, . 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 05/18/84 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: David DATE: May 18, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-490 Davis v. Scherer 
It is apparent that you did not find this case 
as easy to write as I had assumed. Your draft opinion 
persuades me that I did not fully understand the case, and 
still have some uncertainties about it. I have scanned 
the opinion once and now - as I reread it - I will dictate 
comments of varying degrees of importance. 
1. You will not be surprised when I say that my 
one firm impression is that the opinion is too long. We 
should make the arguments (especially in IIB) in summary 
form - without repeating so much of what prior immunity 
cases have said. 
2. Add a footnote in the statement of the cas~ 
identifying the appellants and the capacities (personal) 
in which they are being sued. 
3. Page 5 is not clear to me. It states that 
appellee filed an administrative appeal with the Florida 
Commission, claiming that the rule governing dual 
employment had not been validly adopted. The draft then 
,. 
2. 
states that five months later, appellee filed with the 
same commission a petition challenging the validity of the 
dismissal rule. It then states that the commission agreed 
that the rule was invalid. Were two separate petitions 
filed with the commission, and if so what was the 
difference? The commission held that 
invalid. What is the relevance of this? 
this rule was 
My understanding 
is that this rule is not the administrative regulation at 
issue. 
4. On pp. 6 and 7, the draft briefly describes 
the present suit and the action of the courts below. It 
seems to me that the opinion would be better understood if 
this portion of Part I were expanded to make somewhat 
clearer exactly what happened. See, for example, the SG's 
statement of the case, p. 2-4 of his brief. I am inclined 
to think that a reader of the opinion will be helped by 
stating in Part I- rather than in Part II as the draft i~ / 
now written - the change of the DC' s holding following 
CAS's decision in Weisbrod. 
5. It seems to me, David, that Part II requires 
a good deal of revison. It now starts out with Harlow (p. 
8), and the reader has to look to footnote 4 to get any 
real idea of the question presented and how it arose. 
3. 
It is critical to our decision that the DC 
expressly held, in its second opinion, that the asserted 
due process right was not clearly established at the time 
of appellants conduct. Footnote 4 addresses this 
question. I am inclined to think the substance of that 
note should go in the text prior to any discus ion of 
Harlow. You properly conclude at the end of footnote 4 
that the District Court was right in finding no violation 
of a clearly established constitutional right. If 
Weisbrod fairly can be read in this way - as the DC read 
it - is not this the controlling law in CAS? We could 
then add in a much shorter footnote the substance of your 
discussion to the effect that even under Supreme Court 
decisions the law as to the type of hearing was far from 
clear. 
Certainly in this case the DC's holding is 
justified by the facts you summarize in the next to th'e " 
last paragraph of note 4. In truth, appellee had full 
notice plus an extended opportunity to state his 
objections, and indeed the highway department was 
attentive and gave him some relief. It seems to me we 
should include perhaps with some elaboration - this 
paragraph in the text as further evidence that there was 
4. 
no objective basis for appellants to believe they were 
violating appellee's constitutional rights. 
6. After concluding that at least in the Fifth 
Circuit and under the circumstances of this case, the 
right claimed was not clearly established, the question is 
whether there was a deprivation of constitutional rights 
because of a failure to comply with a state administrative 
regulation. None of the briefs adequately addresses this 
question. Section 1983 applies only to federal 
constitutional and statutory rights. If there was no 
clearly established constitutional right, and no federal 
statutory right, is a cause of action alleged under §1983? 
Footnote 9 is appellee's brief (p. 32) is revealing. It 
argues that even if plaintiff's constitutional rights were 
not clearly established, violation of a state regulation 
"designed to protect constitutional interest" 
actionable under §1983. The footnote states that: 
"Implicit in this inquiry is the existence of a 
constitutional principle, for the §1983 damage 
relief is aimed at violation of federal, not 
state law." 
is 
In other words, as I understand it, the argument 
is that because the state regulation arguably was intended 
to protect constitutional "interests", §1983 applies. But 
5. 
that section applies only to violations of constitutional 
rights. 
7. In subpart IIA, you address the appellee! s 
contention that the alleged breach was of "ministr ial" 
rather than "discretionary" duties. This argument is 
frivolous, and I would answer it simply in a footnote. 
Determining whether to discharge an employee, particularly 
on the facts of this case, was clearly a judgment or 
discretionary "call". 
8. Subpart IIB (pp. 15-23) is puzzling to me, 
perhaps because I still do not understand this case. It 
also seems substantial repetitious of what has been said -
particularly in Harlow and Butz. Appellee's argument, as 
noted above, is that the state regulation embodies 
implicitly a "constitutional principle": namely, the 
requirement of the specific procedural due process 
specified in the regulation. - " Yet, if Weisbrod can be read 
as saying the nature and extent of procedural due process 
relevant to this case is not clearly established in CAS, I 
would think that the state regulation - to the extent it 
may require something different is only a matter of 
state law. If so, there should be no action under §1983, 
and we would not reach the immunity issue. The SG and 
'· 
6. 
your draft (Part IIB) do not appear to make this argument. 
Rather, you argue the broader question whether a state 
regulation ever may establish a basis 
constitutional violation, and if so is 
for asserting . a 
there qualified 
immunity? Is it necessary for us to make such a broad 
argument in this case? 
At this point, it is clear that I need to be 





TO: David DATE: May 22, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-490 Davis v. Scherer 
This is being dictated at horne Monday evening 
after reading your second draft. Subject to what is said 
below, I find this draft much clearer and more persuasive 
than our first. I still have troubles. 
The first 11 pages are fine. 
At the outset of Part II (p. 12) you make the 
important point that the DC relied upon a "totality" 
analysis rather than the objective standard of Harlow. I 
agree that no "circumstances" are relevant other than 
whether there was a "clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would 
have known". I still wonder, however, David, whether the ,. . 
reference in Harlow - and other cases - was not to federal 
statutory rights. Clearly we were talking only about 
federal constitutional rights. 
Appellee makes two arguments. On the basis of 
the DC's second opinion and the law in CAS, there is no 
, .. 
merit to appellee's first argument that there was a 
violation of a "clearly established constitutional right". 
Appellee's second argument apparently the 
troublesome one - is that "absent a violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right", there was a violation 
of a clearly established state administrative regulation 
(a "state statute"), and this forecloses qualified 
immunity. 
In IIA, you dispose of appellee's first argument 
by making two points: (i) the law in CAS, as established 
by Weisbrod clearly was to the contrary, as the DC below 
recognized. This, alone, seems to be a conclusive answer. 
On p. 14 of your draft, you make the further point that it 
was not unreasonable for the Department to conclude that 
appellee had in fact been provided with the fundamentals 
of due process. I suggest, David, that you revise this 
page to say that even if the constittuional question had 
not been clearly established in CAS, the substance of 
procedural due process was accorded appellee, and this 
fairly could be viewed as disposing of any constitutional 
claim. 
My difficulty still is with how best to deal 
with the state regulation. Unless we say, as I understand 
appellee to argue, that the state regulation simply 
embodies a federal constitutional due process standard, 
the regulation because it is state law only is 
immaterial. But in view of the uncertainty of the 
constitutional question in CAS, how can a state regulation 
be viewed as embodying more than an unsettled 
constitutional question? 
Appellee does argue that Harlow makes immunity 
available only to officials whose conduct conforms to a 
standard of "objective legal reasonableness". Again, this 
can only apply in a §1983 case to a federal standard. 
On page 16 you note that appellee argues that an 
official's violation of a state statute "although not 
actionable in itself" should deprive the official of 
qualified immunity in a suit for violation of other 
statutory or constitutional rights. 
rights are involved in this case? 
But what other such 
From p. 17 to the end of Part II, you make the 
policy "balancing" arguments that are persuasive. But I 
continue to wonder whether we get that far. Here we have 
a case where it is, in effect, conceded that the law of 
CAS was to the effect that discharging a state employee in 
the circumstances of this case did not violate a well 
established due process right. In addition, on the facts 
of this case we had the functional equivalent of full 
compliance with due process. The DC itself decided the 
case on the basis of a "totality of circumstances" - a 
test identified in Rhodes, but rejected - in effect - by 
Butz and Harlow. Thus, in the absence of any clear 
constitutional violation, the only circumstance identified 
is a state law. And if that does not rise to the level of 
a constitutional right, how does §1983 apply. If it does 
not, do we even reach the immunity issue? 
* * * 
David, even though we discussed much of the 
above preliminarily, I do not suggest that I fully 
understand this case. If what is said above prompts you 
to adhere to your present draft at least tentatively, I 
suggest that you try it out on Joe Neuhaus, identifying 
for him my concerns. 
I add one final point, as noted in the margin, 
Part III on page 22 needs to be revised as it does not 
seem to include the immunity issue. Also we should look 




Davis v. Scherer, No. 83-490 
It 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This appeal requires us to decide whether a state 
official loses his qualified immunity from suit for 
deprivation of federal constitutional rights because he is 
found to have violated the command of a state 
administrative regulation. 
I 
The present controversy arose when appellee 
Gregory Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway 
Patrol as a radio-teletype operator, applied to permission 
from the Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County 
Sheriff's Off ice as a reserve deputy. 
2. 
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 
~~~~~ 
/\ ~quir~d that proposed 0 outside ' employment of Patrol 
members be examined to detect potential conflicts of 
interest.')' 
~A letter from appellee's troop commander Captain 
K. S. Sconiers, dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee 
permission to accept the part-time work. The letter noted 
that permission would be rescinded "should [the] 
employment interfere with your duties in [the] 
department." J. S. App. Sa. Later that month, Capt. 
, 
Sconiers informed appellee by memorandum that permissioh 
to accept the employment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers 
explained at trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol 
had determined that appellee's reserve deputy duties might 
conflict with his duties at the Highway Patrol. 
3. 
Appellee continued to work at the second job, 
despite the memorandum of revocation. Oral discussions 
and an exchange of letters among appellee and his 
superiors ensued. Sgt. Clark, appellee's immediate 
superior, advised appellee that he was violating 
instructions; appellee explained that he had invested too 
much money in uniforms to give up his parttime work. Lt. 
Wiggins, appellee's next superior, then orally and by 
memorandum ordered appellee to quit his job. Appellee 
explained to Lt. Wiggins that he saw no conflict between 
the two jobs and would not quit his second job. 
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted 
memoranda to Capt. Sconiers that described appellee's 
continued employment and their conversations with 
appellee. Appellee also wrote to Capt. Sconiers 
4. 
explaining that he saw no reason to resign his outside 
employment. On this basis, Capt. Sconiers recommended to 
Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida Highway Patrol, 
that appellee be suspended for three days for violation of 
the dual employment policy. With his recommendation, 
Capt. Sconiers submitted a number of documents, including 
his own letters approving appellee's request and 
rescinding the approval: appellee's letter of request and 
subsequent letter explaining his refusal to quit his job: 
and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins. 1 On the 
basis of these documents, Col. Beach ordered that 
appellee's employment be terminated effective October 20, 
1one memorandum reported to Capt. Sconie0rth::appelle:\ 
had continued to work at his second job: a second had 
been addressed by Lt. Wiggins to appellee: other memoranda 
Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's discussion with appellee. 
1977. 
~~ 
On November 10 , 1977, appellee filed an appeal 
/\ 
with the Florida Career Service Commission. Appellee 
claimed that he had been dismissed without just cause, as 
his dismissal was pursuant to a rule -- the rule governing 
dual employment -- that had not been adopted validly by 
the department. Five months later, appellee filed with 
the Commission a petition that challenged the validity of 
the rul2 
~ <11 Ae~~ ~Lle~' S. petition, T he Commission 
deeia<e~~e ~allaAged rule was invalid. Before ~ 
L--I-
e~ heard appellee's administrative appeal from his 
1\ 
dismissal, appellee and the Department settled the 
dispute. T~e 
tzM.,a~~~ 
~~~~ reinstated app~lee with back 
pay. Friction between appellee and his superiors 
6. 
~ ~ 
continued) fiewe·v•e:l_~ 41'1. January 1979/o a-fter appel:i~ was 
~~' ~',._."""_ 
suspended from ~ Patrot \. ~ ;fisigned "to avoid further 
harassment and to remove a cloud over his employability." 
J.S. App. 23a • 
.(~~~ 
Appell~ ~~filed the present suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of 
I~ 
Florida, seeking relief under 42 u.s.c. §1983. Appellee~s 
complaint alleged that the Department had violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his job without a 
pretermination hearing and by coercing him to accept an 
' inadequate settlement as compensation. The complaint also 
c::va.-. ~ ? 7 




under the First and Ninth Amendments. Appellee requested 
a declaration that his rights had been violated and an 
award of ~;~ ~ t:fJi;;e;c az~ 
~) 
7. 
The District Court granted the requested relief 
for violation of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 2 
J+ 
The IH s-tF iet Cettr-t found that appellee had a property 
" 
interest in his job and that neither a pretermination nor 
a prompt post-termination hearing had been provided ~ 
as required by the Due Process clause. F-tir ~er, 1he 
~ 
~t l ourt? eclared Florida's statutory provisions 
governing removal of state employees unconstitutional 
"insofar as they fail to provide a prompt post-termination 
hearing." J. S. Ap. • 7 Sa. 
~ 
The Bistr-iG-t.. / ourt ..1\  
' " concluded that appellants had forfeited their qualifie'd 
immunity from suit under section 1983 and awarded 
compensatory damages .. e.e ep~el~. The Court of Appeals 
2The DC rejected appellees' other constitutional claims. 
8. 
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed without opinion. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, u.s. 
(1983) , 3 and now reverse. 
II 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800 (1982), 
established that "government officials performing 
91-~ 
3Th is case ~ ~hin the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction because the judgment d clared a state statute 
unconstitutional. 28 u.s.c. §1254(2 . Appellee concedes, 
however, that the District Court 1 eked jurisdiction to 
consider the constitutionality of the Florida civil 
service statute now in force. tiTat replaced the statute 
under which appellee's em_El_q:rment was terminated. The 
current State statute was~  applied to appellee, who 
therefore lacks standing to question its 
constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 u.s. 10} , 
(1969). . 
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court 
of appellate jurisdiction over the case. That 
jurisdiction comprises the power to decide the "Federal 
questions presented," 28 u.s.c. §1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v. 
Wiener, 321 u.s. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corp., 443 u.s. 173 (1979). Under §1254(2), the 
Court retains discretion to decline to consider those 
issues in the case not related to the declaration that the 
State state is invalid. In the present case, however, we 
~ consider the important question whether the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals properly denied 
appellants' good faith immunity from suit. 
9. 
discretionary functions are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known." 457 u.s., at 
818. The touchstone of qualified immunity is the 
"objective reasonableness of an official's conduct as 
measured by reference to clearly established law." rd. 
-«,/\o 1- t I 
The District Court held , that the Due Process 
right that provided the basis for the relief granted to 
appellee was not so clearly established at the time of 
' " appellants' conduct as to deprive appellants of their gooti 
faith immunity. 4 The District Court reasoned, however, 
4The District Court initially held that appellee's Due 
Process right to a hearing before termination of his 
employment was clearly established by Thurston v. Dekle, 
531 F.2d 1264 (1976). After the Court of Appeals decided 
the case of Weisbrod v. Donigan, 651 F.2d 334, 336 (1981), 
Footnote continued on next page. 
a -
10. 
that "if an official violates his agency's explicit 
however, the District Court amended its judgment, as 
Weisbrod apparently interpreted Thurston hot to establish 
clearly the constitutional right of state employees to a 
pretermination or a prompt post-termination hearing. 
This holding technically is not comprised within 
the questions presented by appellants' jurisdictional 
statement. Nonetheless, as a matter of the sound exercise 
of our discretion, see note 3, supra, we would not reverse 
the judgment below on qualified immunity grounds nor reach 
the ~ issues presented by this case, if appellee 
had established that appellants had forfeited their 
qualified immunity by violating clear c6nstitutional 
rights. We therefore note that we agree with the holding 
of the District Court. Although it apparent1Y was well 
established by 1975 that Florida law grante~mployees a 
property interest, protected by the Due Process clause, in 
permanent C~r~r ~~' it was unclear, at the time 
of the incident that gave rise to the present lawsuit, 
what procedures the Constitution required for termination 
of employment. The decisions of this Court had required 
"some form of hearing." But, as we had considered 
circumstances in which no hearing at all had been provided 
prior to termination of employment, Board of Relents v. 
Roth, 408 u.s. 564 (1972), Perry v. Sinderman, 08 u.s. 
593 (1972), or in which the requirements of due proces,s , 
were met, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 u.s. 134 (1974), Bishop 
v. Wood, 426 u.s. 341 (1976), we had no occasion to 
specify any set of minimally acceptable procedures. Nor 
did the applicable precedents of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit resolve this question. We give some 
deference to that court's conclusion that the law 
governing termination of state employees was unclear. See 
Weisbrod v. Donigan, supra. In any case, the court's 
conclusion appears correct with regard to the law that 
would be applicable to the present suit. The prior Fifth 
Circuit case upon which the District Court had relied, 
Thurston v. Dekle, supra, concerned the procedures that 
the City of Jacksonville must follow to discharge members 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
regulations, which have the force of state law, [that] is 
evidence that his conduct is unreasonable." J. S. App. 
68a. The court found appellants to have acted 
unreasonably because they had violated personnel rules of 
the Florida Highway Patrol that required a pre-termination 
investigation. 5 In our view, the District Court's 
of its Civil Service. The circumstances of the present 
case differ in important respects from those in Thurston. 
A balancing of the state and individual interests relevant 
to the Due Process analysis, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
u.s. 319, 334-335 (1976), may dictate different procedures 
to govern the relation of the State to the members of its 
police force. 
It was not unreasonable, under general Fourteenth 
Amendment principles, for the Department to conclude that 
appellee had been provided with the rudiments of due , 
process. Appellee was informed several times of th~ 
Department's objection to his employmentt and ppellee 
took advantage of several opportunities to present his 
reasons for retaining his second employment. It is 
undisputed that appellee's statement of reasons and other 
relevant information were before the official who made the 
decision to terminate appellee's employment. And Florida 
law provided for a full evidentiary hearing after 
termination. 
We conclude, as did the District Court, that 
there was no violation of appellee's clearly established 
constitutional rights. 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
12. 
reasoning is inconsistent with our precedents. 
A 
Appellee urges that we need not decide whether 
appellants forfeited their qualified immunity by violating 
the Highway Patrol regulation. Rather, appellee contends 
that he is entitled to damages for appellants' breach of 
their "ministerial" duty --established by the regulation -
to follow various procedures before terminating 
5These rules specified in pertinent part: 
Upon receiving a report of ••• a violation of 
Department or Division rules and regulations 
••. , the Director shall order a complete 
investigation to determine the true facts 
concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
alleged offense. The completed investigation 
report will also contain a written statement 
made by the employee against whom the complain 
was made. If after a thorough study of all 
information concerning the violation, the 
Director decides that a .•• dismissal will be in 
order, he will present the employee in writing 
with the reason or reasons for such actions. 
General Order No. 43 §l.C (September 1, 1977), quoted at 
J. S. App. 6 9a. 
13. 
appellee's employment. 
Appellee's contention misapprehends the narrow 
reach of the conception of "ministerial duty" as it has 
been applied in the context of official immunity. 6 A 
ministerial duty is one that leaves the official no choice 
as to how to act. A law or administrative directive 
establishes such a duty when it unambiguously sets forth 
each act that is required of the official and deprives the 
official of any authority to deviate from its terms. 
E.g., Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 u.s. 136, 138 (1870); 
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 u.s. 87, 98 (1845). By contrast·, 
6of course, a statute or regulation that deprives an 
official of all discretion will be rare indeed. Perhaps 
for that reason, the Court has had no occasion to consider 
the place of the "ministerial duty" exception in the 
modern doctrine of qualified immunity. Our disposition of 
appellee's contention makes it unnecessary to consider 
this question, A-G\l)::'e ~;o. 
14. 
the rules that purportedly established appellants' 
"ministerial" duties in the present case left to 
appellants a substantial measure of discretion. 
Appellants were to determine, for example, what 
constituted a "complete investigation" and a "thorough 
study of all information" sufficient to justify a decision 
to terminate appellee's employment. See note 5, supra. 
The District Court's finding that appellants 
exceeded the scope of their authority or ignored a clear 
legal command does not bear on the "ministerial" nature of 
appellants' duties. Appellee's submission to the contrary 
confuses the issues whether the official's action was 
discretionary and whether the official forfeited his 
immunity. Whether a duty is ministerial or discretionary 
depends upon the law that creates that duty, not upon the 
15. 
facts of the official 1 s conduct. A law that fails to 
specify the precise action that the official must take in 
each instance creates only discretionary authority: and 
that authority remains discretionary however egregiously 
it is abused. Cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 
(1896): Kendall v. Stokes, supra. As we have concluded, 
appellants were exercising discretionary authority in the 
decisions that are the subject of the present lawsuit. 
B 
Nor does appellants 1 failure to comply with a 
~ olea~ state regulation deprive them of qualified immunit~ 
from suit for violation of federal constitutional rights. 7 
7The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of 
Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (CAS 1982), that had held 
that official conduct in violation of an explicit and 
clearly established state regulation was ~ se 
unreasonable. Id., at 899. The District Court, in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
, 
16. 
It was well established even before Harlow that, under the 
"objective" prong of the good faith immunity test, "an 
official would not be held liable in damages under §1983 
unless the constitutional right he was alleged to have 
violated was 'clearly established' at the time of the 
violation." Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 498 (1978) 
contrast, thought that such conduct was one factor 
relevant to the inquiry, although it did not indicate what 
other factors it considered pertinent in the present case. 
As we explain, however, even the more limited weight that 
the District Court gave to the State regulation is 
inconsistent with qualified immunity doctrine. 
The District Court's application of the "totality 
of the circumstances" test articulated in Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 247-248 (1974), see J.S. App. 68a, 
suggests that the court may have viewed the clear , 
violation of a state regulation as evidence relevant tb 
appellants' subjective intent as well as to the objective 
reasonableness of their conduct. After Harlow, the 
official's intent or state of mind simply is not relevant 
to the qualified immunity defense. Even if the existence 
of a clear statutory or administrative command reflected 
upon the official's subjective intent, therefore, that 
fact would have no bearing on the question of immunity. 
We decline to disinter even in truncated form the pre-
Harlow inquiry into the motives for the official's 
conduct. 
17. 
(emphasis added} • See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 
u.s. 555, 562 (1978}. Officials sued for constitutional 
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely 
because their conduct might violate some other statutory 
or administrative norm. 8 
A contrary rule would disrupt the balance that 
our cases strike between the interests in the vindication 
01tLs 
of ~ constitutional rights and in public officials' 
effective performance of their duties. The qualified 
irnrnuni ty doctrines fosters respect for fundamental ci vi 1 
8 rn Harlow, the Court acknowledged that officials may 
lose their immunity by violating "clearly established 
statutory r i g h t s • " 4 57 U. S • , at 818 • Th i s i s the 
case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for 
violation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, 
see id., at 820 n. 36, and as in many §1983 suits, see, 
e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 u.s. 1 (1980}. For the 
reasons we discuss here, officials sued for violations of 
rights conferred by statute, like officials sued for 
violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their 
immunity by violating some other statute or regulation. 
lB. 
liberties by holding officials "to a standard of conduct 
based on knowledge of basic, unquestioned 
constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 
322 (1975). Yet the doctrine also recognizes that 
officials can act without fear of harassing litigation 
only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct 
may give rise to liability for damages and only if 
unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. To achieve 
these ends, officials are held liable in damages only for 
violation of • clearly established rights. See Butz v. 
, 
Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 506-507 (1978); Harlow v·. 
Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. , at 814, 818-819. Without this 
immunity doctrine, the specter of litigation would be a 
strong incentive to official inaction. Further, by 
preventing the imposition of onerous monetary liability 
19. 
that reasonably could not have been anticipated and 
therefore avoided at the time of the official conduct in 
question, the qualified immunity doctrine treats public 
officials fairly and thereby encourages responsible 
citizens to hold public office. Cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 u.s. 949 
(1950). 
The benefits of the doctrine are lost, however, 
to the extent that officials cannot predict with 
confidence whether their actions may give rise to a 
- , 
successful suit for damages, or even to one that may 
survive a motion for summary judgment. The rule advocated 
by appellee would engender such uncertainty. Officials 
would be liable in indeterminate amount for violation of 
~ constitutional right one that was not clearly 
20. 
defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time of 
the alleged violation -- merely because their official 
conduct also violated some statute or regulation. The 
potential expansion of liability is large: the open-ended 
provisions of the Bill of Rights provide enormous 
~ 
opportunity for ingenious litigants, and virtually ~ 
executive decision~ be governed by some statute or 
regulation. 
a.-
A requirement that plaintiffs allege ..s clear 
violation of a statute or regulation would not alleviate 
the untoward consequences of such an expansion of 
liability. For it is erroneous to assume, as does 
appellee, that there is no public interest in permitting 
officials without fear of damages liability to take action 
that may violate statutes or regulations. Nor is it 
21. 
always fair to demand official compliance with statute and 
regulation on pain of money damages. There are a myriad 
of statutory and administrative rules whose official 
violation justly gives rise to no private damages action, 
even if that violation also infringes upon some arguable 
constitutional right. 9 Such officials as police officers 
or prison wardens, to say nothing of higher-level 
executive levels who enjoy only qualified immunity, 
9This is reflected in the variety of means that States 
and the Federal government have adopted to obtain official 
compliance with statutes and regulations. The legislature 
may decide for any number of reasons that a damages remedy , 
against the individual official would be an inappropriat~ 
means of enforcing a rule. The damages suit is a costly 
and clumsy means of securing compliance with statutes or 
regulations. Administrative or judicial review, 
internally imposed sanctions, or various formal or 
informal incentives for exemplary conduct may be at least 
equally effective measures for encouraging official 
compliance with legal norms. And it is arbitrary to make 
award of damages for violation of various statutes and 
regulations hinge upon whether violation of the rule in a 
given case also happened to violate some Federal 
constitutional right. 
22. 
routinely make decisions of enormous difficulty. These 
officials are subject to a plethora of rules, "often so 
voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux 
that officials can comply with them only selectively." 10 
In these circumstances, officials should not err always on 
the side of caution. "[O)fficials with a broad range of 
duties and authority must often act swiftly and firmly at 
the risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute 
virtual abdication of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
10see Schuck, Suing Government, at 66. We find littl~ , 
reassurance in appellee's suggestion that officials migh~ 
forfeit their immunity when they had violated rules that 
advanced important interests or were designed to protect 
constitutional rights. This approach would create only 
additional uncertainty. Officials would be required not 
only to know all applicable regulations, but also to 
understand the intent with which each regulation was 
adopted. Such an understanding often eludes even trained 
lawyers with full access to the relevant legislative or 
administrative materials. It is unfair and impracticable 
to require such an understanding of public officials 
generally. 
23. 
u.s., at 246. Too rigid an adherence to administrative 
rules may impede prompt and effective action while 
advancing no public countervailing public interest. 
III 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellants in this case challenge the holding of the Court of 
Appeals that ·a state official loses his qualified immunity from 
suit for deprivation of federal constitutional rights if he is 
found to have violated the clear command of a state adminis-
trative regulation. 
I 
The present controversy arose when appellee Gregory 
Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol 
as a radio-teletype operator, applied for permission from the 
Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County Sheriff's Of-
fice as a reserve deputy. To avoid conflicts of interest, an 
order of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Mo-
tor Vehicles required that proposed outside employment of 
Patrol members be approved by the Department. A letter 
from appellee's troop commander Captain K. S. Sconiers, 
dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee permission to ac-
cept the part-time work. The letter noted that permission 
would be rescinded "should [the] employment interfere ... 
with your duties with [the] department." App. to Juris. 
Statement 5a. Later that month, Capt. Sconiers informed 
appellee by memorandum that permission to accept the em-
ployment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers explained at 
trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol had determined 
83-490-0PINION 
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that appellee's reserve deputy duties could conflict with his 
duties at the Highway Patrol. 
Appellee continued to work at the second job, despite the 
revocation of permission. Oral discussions and an exchange 
of letters among appellee and his superiors ensued. Sgt. 
Clark, appellee's immediate superior, advised appellee that 
he was violating instructions; appellee explained that he had 
invested too much money in uniforms to give up his part-time 
work. Lt. Wiggins, the next highest officer in the chain of 
command, then orally and by memorandum ordered appellee 
to quit his part-time job. Appellee explained to Lt. Wiggins 
that he saw no conflict between the two jobs and would not 
quit his second job. 
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted memoranda to 
Capt. Sconiers that described appellee's continued employ-
ment and their conversations with appellee. Appellee also 
wrote to Capt. Sconiers explaining that he saw no reason· to 
resign his outside employment. So advised, Capt. Sconiers 
recommended to Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida 
Highway Patrol, that appellee be suspended for three days 
for violation of the dual-employment policy. Capt. Sconiers 
submitted a number of documents, including his own letters 
approving appellee's request and rescinding the approval; ap-
pellee's letter of request and subsequent letter explaining his 
refusal to quit his job; and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and 
Lt. Wiggins. 1 On the basis of these documents, Col. Beach 
on October 24, 1977, ordered that appellee's employment 
with the Florida Highway Patrol be terminated. 
On November 10, 1977, appellee filed an appeal with the 
Florida Career Service Commission. Before the Commis-
sion had heard appellee's administrative appeal from his dis-
missal, appellee and the Department settled the dispute. 
' One memorandum reported to Capt. Sconiers that appellee had contin-
ued to work at his second job; a second had been addressed by Lt. Wiggins 
to appellee; other memoranda summarized Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's 
discussions with appellee. 
. . 
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The settlement reinstated appellee with back pay. But fric-
tion between appellee and his superiors conti11ued, and in 
January 1979, after appellee was suspended from the Patrol, 
he resigned "to avoid further harassment and to remove a 
cloud over his employability." App. to Juris. Statement 23a. 
Appellee then filed the present suit against appellants in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida, seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.2 Appellee's 
complaint alleged that appellants in 1977 had violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discharging 
appellee from his job without a formal pretermination or a 
prompt post-termination hearing. 3 Appell~e requested a 
declaration that his rights had been violated and an award of 
money damages. · 
The District Court granted the requested relief for viola-
tion of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 The 
court found that appellee had a .property interest in his job 
and that the procedures followed by appellants to discharge 
appellee were constitutionally "inadequate" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. App. to Juris. Statement 35a. Fur-
ther, the court declared unconstitutional Florida's statutory 
provisions governing removal of state employees, Fla. Stat. 
§ 110.061 (1977). Finally, the District Court concluded that 
appellants had forfeited their qualified immunity from suit 
under § 1983 because appellee's "due process rights were 
2 Appellant Ralph Davis was Executive Director of the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles at the time of appellee's discharge 
from employment. Appellant Chester Blakemore succeeded Davis to that 
position and is a party only in his official capacity. Appellant Colonel J. 
Eldridge Beach is Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; as noted above, he 
held that position at the time of appellee's discharge. 
3 The complaint also alleged that appellants, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, had coerced appellee to accept an inadequate settle-
ment and had infringed upon appellee's the right of privacy guaranteed by 
the First and Ninth Amendments. 
' The District Court rejected appellee's other constitutional claims. 
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clearly established at the time of his October 24, 1977 dis-
missal." App. to Juris. ·statement 46a. 
Five days after entry of the District Court's order, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Weisbrod v. 
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (1981). The Court of Appeals there 
held that Florida officials in 1978 had violated no well estab-
lished due process rights in discharging a permanent state 
employee without a pre-termination or a prompt post-termi-
nation hearing. On motion for reconsideration, the District 
Court found that Weisbrod required it to vacate its prior 
holding that appellants had forfeited their immunity by vi-
olating appellee's clearly established constitutional rights. 
Th.e court nevertheless reaffirmed its award of monetary 
damages. It reasoned that proof that an official had violated 
clearly established constitutional rights was not the "sole 
way" to overcome the official's claim of qualified immunity. 
Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test of Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974), the District Court 
held that "if an official violates his agency's explicit regula-
tions, which have the force of state law, [that] is evidence 
that his conduct is unreasonable." App. to Juris. Statement 
68a. 5 In this respect, the court noted that the personnel 
regulations of the Florida Highway Patrol clearly required "a 
complete investigation of the charge and an opportunity [for 
the employee] to respond in writing." Id., at 70a. 6 The 
6 The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of Williams v. 
Treen, 671 F. 2d 892 (CA5 1982), cert denied,- U. S.- (1983), that 
had held that official conduct in violation of an explicit and clearly estab-
lished state regulation was per se unreasonable. I d., at 899. 
6 These rules specified in pertinent part: 
Upon receiving a report of ... a violation of Department or Division rules 
and regulations ... , the Director shall order a complete investigation to 
determine the true facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the al-
leged offense. The completed investigation report will also contain a writ-
ten statement made by the employee against whom the complaint was 
made. If after a thorough study of all information concerning the viola-
tion, the Director decides that a ... dismissal will be in order, he will 
83-4~0PINION 
DAVIS v. SCHERER 5 
District Court concluded that appellants in discharging appel-
• · lee had "followed procedures contrary to the department's 
rules and regulations"; therefore, appellants were "not enti-
tled to qualified immunity because their belief in the legality 
of the challenged conduct was unreasonable." Ibid. The 
court explicitly relied upon the official violation of the person-
nel rule, stating that "if [the] departmental order had not 
been adopted ... prior to [appellee's] dismissal, no damages 
of any kind could be awarded." Ibid. The District Court's 
order amending the judgment did not discuss the issue 
whether appellants violated appellee's federal constitutional 
rights. On that issue, the District Court relied upon its pre-
vious opinion; the court did not indicate that the personnel 
regulation was relevant to its analysis of appellee's rights 
under the due process clause. 
The District Court also amended its judgment declaring 
the Florida civil service statute unconstitutional. The 
State's motion for reconsideration had informed the court 
that the statute had been repealed by the Florida legislature. 
The District Court therefore declared unconstitutional the 
provisions of the newly enacted civil service statute, Fla. 
Stat. ch. 110 (1981), "insofar as they fail to provide a prompt 
post-termination hearing." App. to Juris. Statement 80a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District 
Court's opinion. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. 
-- (1983), to consider whether the Court of Appeals prop-
erly had declared the Florida statute unconstitutional and de-
nied appellants' claim of qualified immunity. Appellants do 
not seek review of the District Court's finding that appellee's 
constitutional rights were violated. As appellee now con-
cedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the constitutionality of the Florida statute enacted in 1981, 
present the employee in writing with the reason or reasons for such 
actions. 
General Order No. 43 § l.C (September 1, 1977), quoted at J . S. App. 69a. 
. . 
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we consider only the issue of qualified immunity. 7 We 
reverse. 
II 
In the present posture of this case, the District Court's de-
cision that appellants violated appellee's rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is undisputed. 8 This finding of the 
District Court-based entirely upon federal constitutional 
law-resolves the merits of appellee's underlying claim for 
relief under§ 1983. It does not, however, decide the issue of 
damages. Even defendants who violate constitutional rights 
enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability 
for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their con-
duct was unreasonable under the applicable standard. The 
precise standard for determining when an official may assert 
the qualified immunity defense has been clarified by recent 
cases, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U. S. 800 (1982). The present case requires us to consider 
the application of the standard where the official's conduct vi-
olated a state regulation as well as a provision of the federal 
Constitution. 
7 The Florida civil service statute now in force replaced the statute 
under which appellee's employment was terminated. As the current 
State statute was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question 
its constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969). 
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction 
over the remaining issue in the case. In cases where the Court of Appeals 
has declared a state statute unconsitutional, this Court may decide the 
"Federal questions presented," 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v. 
Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 
443 U. S. 173 (1979). Under § 1254(2), the Court retains discretion to de-
cline to consider those issues in the case not related to the declaration that 
the State statute is invalid. In the present case, however, we choose to 
consider the important question whether the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals properly denied appellants' good faith immunity from suit. 
8 As we discuss below, it is contested whether these constitutional 
rights were clearly established at the time of appellants' conduct. 
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The District Court's analysis of appellants' qualified immu-
nity, written before our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
supra, rests upon the "totality of the circumstances" sur-
rounding appellee's separation from his job. This Court ap-
plied that standard in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 
247-248. As subsequent cases recognized, Wood v. 
Strickland, supra, at 322, the "totality of the circumstances" 
test comprised two separate inquiries: an inquiry into the ob-
jective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct in 
light of the governing law, and an inquiry into the official's 
subjective state of mind. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, re-
jected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly ob-
jective standard. Under Harlow, officials "are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 
U. S., at 818. Whether an official may prevail in his quali-
fied immunity defense depends upon the "objective reason-
ableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly 
established law." !d. (footnote deleted). No other "cir-
cumstances" are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity. 
Appellee suggests, however, that the District Court judg-
ment can be reconciled with Harlow in two ways. First, ap-
pellee urges that the record evinces a violation of constitu-
tional rights that were clearly established. Second, in 
appellee's view, the District Court correctly found that, ab-
sent a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, 
appellants' violation of the state administrative regulation-
although irrelevant to the merits of appellee's underlying 
constitutional claim-was decisive of the qualified immunity 
question. In our view, neither submission is consistent with 
our prior cases. 
A 
Appellee contends that the District Court's reliance in its 
qualified immunity analysis upon the state regulation was 
"superfluous," Brief for Appellee 19, because the federal con-
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stitutional right to a pre-termination or a prompt post-termi-
nation hearing was well established in the Fifth Circuit at the 
time of the conduct in question. As the District Court recog-
nized in rejecting appellee's contention, Weisbrod v. 
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (CA5 1981), is authoritative 
precedent to the contrary. Nor was it unreasonable in this 
case, under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, 
for the Department to conclude that appellee had been pro-
vided with the fundamentals of due process. 9 Appellee was 
informed several times of the Department's objection to his 
second employment and took advantage of several opportuni-
ties to present his reasons for retaining that employment. 
Appellee's statement of reasons and other relevant informa-
tion were before the senior official who made the decision to 
discharge appellee. And Florida law provided for a full evi-
dentiary hearing after termination. We conclude that the 
District Court correctly held that appellee has demonstrated 
no violation of his clearly established constitutional rights. 
B 
Appellee's second ground for affirmance in substance is 
that upon which the District Court relied. Appellee submits 
that appellants, by failing to comply with a clear state regula-
tion, forfeited their qualified immunity from suit for violation 
of federal constitutional rights. 
Appellee makes no claim that the appellants' violation of 
the state regulation either is itself actionable under § 1983 or 
9 The decisions of this Court by 1978 had required "some kind of a hear-
ing," Board of R egents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 570 n. 7 (1972), prior to dis-
charge of an employee who had a constitutionally protected property inter-
est in his employment. As the Court had considered circumstances in 
which no hearing at all had been provided prior to termination, Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), or in which the requirements of due proc-
ess were met, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U. S. 134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976); Codd v. Velger, 429 
U. S. 274 (1977), there had been no occasion to specify any minimally ac-
ceptable procedures for termination of employment. 
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bears upon the claim of constitutional right that appellee as-
serts under § 1983. 10 And appellee also recognizes that Har-
low v. Fitzgerald makes immunity available only to officials 
whose conduct conforms to a standard of "objective legal 
reasonableness." 457 U. S., at 819. Nonetheless, in appel-
lee's view, official conduct that contravenes a statute or regu-
lation is not "objectively reasonable" because officials fairly 
may be expected to conform their conduct to such legal 
norms. Appellee also argues that the lawfulness of official 
conduct under such a statute or regulation may be deter-
mined early in the lawsuit on motion for summary judgment. 
Appellee urges therefore that a defendant official's violation 
of a clear statute or regulation, although not itself the basis of 
suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from 
damages for violation of other statutory or constitutional 
provisions. 
On its face, appellee's reasoning is not without some force. 
We decline, however, to adopt it. Even before Harlow, our 
cases had made clear that, under the "objective" component 
of the good faith immunity test, "an official would not be held 
liable in damages under§ 1983 unless the constitutional right 
he was alleged to have violated was 'clearly established' at the 
time of the violation." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 
498 (1978) (emphasis added); accord, Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). Officials sued for constitutional 
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely be-
cause their conduct violates some statutory or administrative 
provision. 11 • 
'"State law may bear upon a claim under the due process clause when the 
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created 
by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Appellee's 
property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee 
does not contend here that the procedural rules in state law govern the 
constitutional analysis of what process was due to him under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
11 In Harlow, the Court acknowledged that officials may lose their immu-
nity by violating "clearly established statutory . . . rights." 457 U. S., at 
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We acknowledge of course that officials should conform 
their conduct to applicable statutes and regulations. For 
that reason, it is an appealing proposition that the violation of 
such provisions is a circumstance relevant to the official's 
claim of qualified immunity. But in determining what cir-
cumstances a court may consider in deciding claims of quali-
fied immunity, we choose "between the evils inevitable in any 
available alternative." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 
813-814. Appellee's submission, if adopted, would disrupt 
the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vin-
dication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' 
effective performance of their duties. The qualified immu-
nity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of 
harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate 
when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and 
818. This is the case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for vi-
olation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, see id., at 820 n. 36, 
and as in many § 1983 suits, see; e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 
(1980) (holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for 
violating federal statutes). For the reasons that we discuss, officials sued 
for violations of rights conferred by a statute or regulation, like officials 
sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by 
violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become 
liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the 
statutory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages. And if a 
statute or regulation does give rise to a cause of action for damages, clear 
violation of the statute or regulation forfeits immunity only with respect to 
damages caused by that violation. In the present case, as we have noted, 
there is no claim that the state regulation itself or the laws that authorized 
· its promulgation create a cause of action for damages or provide the basis 
for an action brought under § 1983. 
Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our cases 
have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits 
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971). See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504. Neither federal nor state 
officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or 
regulation-of federal or of state law-unless that statute or regulation 
provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon. 
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only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. See Butz 
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 50&-507 (1978); Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U. S., at 814, 818--819. Yet, under appellee's 
submission, officials would be liable in indeterminate amount 
for violation of any constitutional right-one that was not 
clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time 
of the alleged violation-merely because their official conduct 
also violated some statute or regulation. And, in § 1983 
suits, the issue whether an official enjoyed qualified immu-
nity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a 
state administrative regulation, questions that federal judges 
often may be unable to resolve on summary judgment. 
Appellee proposes that his new rule for qualified immunity 
be limited by requiring that plaintiffs allege clear violation of 
a statute or regulation that advanced important interests or 
was designed to protect constitutional rights. Yet, once the 
door is opened to such inquiries, it is difficult to limit their. 
scope in any principled manner. Federal judges would be 
granted large discretion to extract from various statutory 
and administrative codes those provisions that seem to them 
sufficiently clear or important to warrant denial of qualified 
immunity. And such judgments fairly could be made only 
after an extensive inquiry into whether the official in the cir-
cumstances of his decision should have appreciated the ap-
plicability and importance of the rule at issue. It would be-
come more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate the 
possible legal consequences of their conduct, 12 but also for 
trial courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted 
litigation. 
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official 
compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money 
12 Officials would be required not only to know the applicable regulations, 
but also to understand the intent with which each regulation was adopted. 
Such an understanding often eludes even trained lawyers with full access 
to the relevant legislative or administrative materials. It is unfair and im-
practicable to require such an understanding of public officials generally. 
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damages. Such officials as police officers or prison wardens, 
to say nothing of higher-level executive levels who enjoy only 
qualified immunity, routinely make close decisions in the ex-
ercise of the broad authority that necessarily is delegated to 
them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, 
"often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in 
such flux that officials can comply with them only selec-
tively." See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In 
these circumstances, officials should not err always on the 
side of caution. "[O]fficials with a broad range of duties and 
authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that 
action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication 
of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 246. 13 
13 Appellee urges as well that appellants' violation of the personnel regu-
lation constituted breach of their "ministerial" duty-established by the 
regulation-to follow various procedures before terminating appellee's em-
ployment. Although the decision to discharge an employee clearly is dis-
cretionary, appellee reasons that the Highway Patrol regulation deprived 
appellants of all discretion in determining what procedures were to be fol-
lowed prior to discharge. Under this view, the Harlow standard is inap-
posite because this Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in 
the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions. 
Appellee's contention mistakes the scope of the "ministerial duty" excep-
tion to qualified immunity in two respects. First, as we have discussed, 
breach of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation would forfeit of-
ficial immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the appellee's cause of 
action for damages. This principle equally applies whether the regulation 
created discretionary or ministerial duties. Even if the personnel regula-
tion did create a ministerial duty, appellee makes no claim that he is enti-
tled to damages simply because the regulation was violated. See pp. 8-10 
and note 11, supra. 
In any event, the rules that purportedly established appellants' "ministe-
rial" duties in the present case left to appellants a substantial measure of 
discretion. Cf. Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U. S. 136, 138 (1870); Kendall 
v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 87, 98 (1845). Appellants were to determine, for exam-
ple, what constituted a "complete investigation" and a "thorough study of 
all information" sufficient to justify a decision to terminate appellee's em-
ployment. See note 6, supra. And the District Court's finding that ap-
pellants ignored a clear legal command does not bear on the "ministerial" 
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III 
A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitu-
tional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant offi-
cial's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights 
were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. 
As appellee has made no such showing, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
nature of appellants' duties. A law that fails to specify the precise action 
that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary au-
thority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is 
abused. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, supra. 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: JUN 2 5 l984 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-490 
, 
RALPH DAVIS, ETC., ET AL. v. 
GREGORY SCOTT SCHERER 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
(June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellants in this case challenge the holding of the Court of 
Appeals that a state official loses his qualified immunity from 
suit for deprivation of federal constitutional rights if he is 
found to have violated the clear command of a state adminis-
trative regulation. 
I 
The present controversy arose when appellee Gregory 
Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol 
as a radio-teletype operator, applied for permission from the 
Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County Sheriff's Of-
fice as a reserve deputy. To avoid conflicts of interest, an 
order of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Mo-
tor Vehicles required that proposed outside employment of 
Patrol members be approved by the Department. A letter 
from appellee's troop commander Captain K. S. Sconiers, 
dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee permission to ac-
cept the part-time work. The letter noted that permission 
would be rescinded "should [the] employment interfere ... 
with your duties with [the] department." App. to Juris. 
Statement 5a. Later that month, Capt. Sconiers informed 
appellee by memorandum that permission to accept the em-
ployment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers explained at 
trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol had determined 
. ' 
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that appellee's reserve deputy duties could conflict with his 
duties at the Highway Patrol. 
Appellee continued to work at the second job, despite the 
revocation of permission. Oral discussions and an exchange 
of letters among appellee and his superiors ensued. Sgt. 
Clark, appellee's immediate superior, advised appellee that 
he was violating instructions; appellee explained that he had 
invested too much money in uniforms to give up his part-time 
work. Lt. Wiggins, the next highest officer in the chain of 
command, then orally and by memorandum ordered appellee 
to quit his part-time job. Appellee explained to Lt. Wiggins 
that he saw no conflict between the two jobs and would not 
quit his second job. 
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted memoranda to 
Capt. Sconiers that described appellee's continued employ-
ment and their conversations with appellee. Appellee also 
wrote to Capt. Sconiers explaining that he saw no reason to 
resign his outside employment. So advised, Capt. Sconiers 
recommended to Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida 
Highway Patrol, that appellee be suspended for three days 
for violation of the dual-employment policy. Capt. Sconiers 
submitted a number of documents, including his own letters 
approving appellee's request and rescinding the approval; ap-
pellee's letter of request and subsequent letter explaining his 
refusal to quit his job; and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and 
Lt. Wiggins. 1 On the basis of these documents, Col. Beach 
on October 24, 1977, ordered that appellee's employment 
with the Florida Highway Patrol be terminated. 
On November 10, 1977, appellee filed an appeal with the 
Florida Career Service Commission. Before the Commis-
sion had heard appellee's administrative appeal from his dis-
missal, appellee and the Department settled the dispute. 
1 One memorandum reported to Capt. Sconiers that appellee had contin-
ued to work at his second job; a second had been addressed by Lt. Wiggins 
to appellee; other memoranda summarized Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's 
discussions with appellee. 
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The settlement reinstated appellee with back pay. But fric-
tion between appellee and his superiors continued, and in 
January 1979, after appellee was suspended from the Patrol, 
he resigned "to avoid further harassment and to remove a 
cloud over his employability. " App. to Juris. Statement 23a. 
Appellee then filed the present suit against appellants in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida, seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.2 Appellee's 
complaint alleged that appellants in 1977 had violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discharging 
appellee from his job without a formal pretermination or a 
prompt post-termination hearing. 3 Appellee requested a 
declaration that his rights had been violated and an award of 
money damages. 
The District Court granted the requested relief for viola-
tion of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 The 
court found that appellee had a property interest in his job 
and that the procedures followed by appellants to discharge 
appellee were constitutionally "inadequate" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. App.to Juris. Statement 35a. Fur-
ther, the court declared unconstitutional Florida's statutory 
provisions governing removal of state employees, Fla. Stat. 
§ 110.061 (1977). Finally, the District Court concluded that 
appellants had forfeited their qualified immunity from suit 
under § 1983 because appellee's "due process rights were 
2 Appellant Ralph Davis was Executive Director of the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles at the time of appellee's discharge 
from employment. Appellant Chester Blakemore succeeded Davis to that 
position and is a party only in his official capacity. Appellant Colonel J. 
Eldridge Beach is Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; as noted above, he 
held that position at the time of appellee's discharge. 
'The complaint also alleged that appellants, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, had coerced appellee to accept an inadequate settle-
ment and had infringed upon appellee's the right of privacy guaranteed by 
the First and Ninth Amendments. 
• The District Court rejected appellee's other constitutional claims. 
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clearly established at the time of his October 24, 1977 dis-
missal." App. to Juris. Statement 46a. 
Five days after entry of the District Court's order, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Weisbrod v. 
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (1981). The Court of Appeals there 
held that Florida officials in 1978 had violated no well estab-
lished due process rights in discharging a permanent state 
employee without a pre-termination or a prompt post-termi-
nation hearing. On motion for reconsideration, the District 
Court found that Weisbrod required it to vacate its prior 
holding that appellants had forfeited their immunity by vi-
olating appellee's clearly established constitutional rights. 
The court nevertheless reaffirmed its award of monetary 
damages. It reasoned that proof that an official had violated 
clearly established constitutional rights was not the "sole 
way" to overcome the official's claim of qualified immunity. 
Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test of Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974), the District Court 
held that "if an official violates his agency's explicit regula-
tions, which have the force of state law, [that] is evidence 
that his conduct is unreasonable." App. to Juris. Statement 
68a. 5 In this respect, the court noted that the personnel 
regulations of the Florida Highway Patrol clearly required "a 
complete investigation of the charge and an opportunity [for 
the employee] to respond in writing." Id., at 70a. 6 The 
6 The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of Williams v. 
Treen, 671 F. 2d 892 (CA5 1982), cert denied,- U. S.- (1983), that 
had held that official conduct in violation of an explicit and clearly estab-
lished state regulation was per se unreasonable. Id., at 899. 
• These rules specified in pertinent part: 
Upon receiving a report of ... a violation of Department or Division rules 
and regulations ... , the Director shall order a complete investigation to 
determine the true facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the al-
leged offense. The completed investigation report will also contain a writ-
ten statement made by the employee against whom the complaint was 
made. If after a thorough study of all information concerning the viola-
tion, the Director decides that a ... dismissal will be in order, he will 
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District Court concluded that appellants in discharging appel-
lee had "followed procedures contrary to the department's 
rules and regulations"; therefore, appellants were "not enti-
tled to qualified immunity because their belief in the legality 
of the challenged conduct was unreasonable." Ibid. The 
court explicitly relied upon the official violation of the person-
nel rule, stating that "if [the] departmental order had not 
been adopted ... prior to [appellee's] dismissal, no damages 
of any kind could be awarded." Ibid. The District Court's 
order amending the judgment did not discuss the issue 
whether appellants violated appellee's federal constitutional 
rights. On that issue, the District Court relied upon its pre-
vious opinion; the court did not indicate that the personnel 
regulation was relevant to its analysis of appellee's rights 
under the due process clause. 
The District Court also amended its judgment declaring 
the Florida civil service statute unconstitutional. The 
State's motion for reconsideration had informed the court 
that the statute had been repealed by the Florida legislature. 
The District Court therefore declared unconstitutional the 
provisions of the newly enacted civil service statute, Fla. 
Stat. ch. 110 (1981), "insofar as they fail to provide a prompt 
post-termination hearing." App. to Juris. Statement 80a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District 
Court's opinion. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. 
-- (1983), to consider whether the Court of Appeals prop-
erly had declared the Florida statute unconstitutional and de-
nied appellants' claim of qualified immunity. Appellants do 
not seek review of the District Court's finding that appellee's 
constitutional rights were violated. As appellee now con-
cedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the constitutionality of the Florida statute enacted in 1981, 
present the employee in writing with the reason or reasons for such 
actions. 
General Order No. 43 § l.C (September 1, 1977), quoted at J. S. App. 69a. 
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we consider only the issue of qualified immunity. 7 We 
reverse. 
II 
In the present posture of this case, the District Court's de-
cision that appellants violated appellee's rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is undisputed. 8 This finding of the 
District Court-based entirely upon federal constitutional 
law-resolves the merits of appellee's underlying claim for 
relief under§ 1983. It does not, however, decide the issue of 
damages. Even defendants who violate constitutional rights 
enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability 
for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their con-
duct was unreasonable under the applicable standard. The 
precise standard for determining when an official may assert 
the qualified immunity defense has been clarified by recent 
cases, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U. S. 800 (1982). The present case requires us to consider 
the application of the standard where the official's conduct vi-
olated a state regulation as well as a provision of the federal 
Constitution. 
7 The Florida civil service statute now in force replaced the statute 
under which appellee's employment was terminated. As the current 
State statute was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question 
its constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969). 
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction 
over the remaining issue in the case. In cases where the Court of Appeals 
has declared a state statute unconsitutional, this Court may decide the 
"Federal questions presented," 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v. 
Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 
443 U. S. 173 (1979). Under§ 1254(2), the Court retains discretion to de-
cline to consider those issues in the case not related to the declaration that 
the State statute is invalid. In the present case, however, we choose to 
consider the important question whether the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals properly denied appellants' good faith immunity from suit. 
8 As we discuss below, it is contested whether these constitutional 
rights were clearly established at the time of appellants' conduct. 
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The District Court's analysis of appellants' qualified immu-
nity, written before our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
supra, rests upon the "totality of the circumstances" sur-
rounding appellee's separation from his job. This Court ap-
plied that standard in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 
247-248. As subsequent cases recognized, Wood v. 
Strickland, supra, at 322, the "totality of the circumstances" 
test comprised two separate inquiries: an inquiry into the ob-
jective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct in 
light of the governing law, and an inquiry into the official's 
subjective state of mind. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, re-
jected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly ob-
jective standard. Under Harlow, officials "are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have lmown." 457 
U. S., at 818. Whether an official may prevail in his quali-
fied immunity defense depends upon the "objective reason-
ableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly 
established law." ld. (footnote deleted). No other "cir-
cumstances" are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity. 
Appellee suggests, however, that the District Court judg-
ment can be reconciled with Harlow in two ways. First, ap-
pellee urges that the record evinces a violation of constitu-
tional rights that were clearly established. Second, in 
appellee's view, the District Court correctly found that, ab-
sent a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, 
appellants' violation of the state administrative regulation-
although irrelevant to the merits of appellee's underlying 
constitutional claim-was decisive of the qualified immunity 
question. In our view, neither submission is consistent with 
our prior cases. 
A 
Appellee contends that the District Court's reliance in its 
qualified immunity analysis upon the state regulation was 
"superfluous," Brief for Appellee 19, because the federal con-
\ 
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stitutional right to a pre-termination or a prompt post-termi-
nation hearing was well established in the Fifth Circuit at the 
time of the conduct in question. As the District Court recog-
nized in rejecting appellee's contention, Weisbrod v. 
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (CA5 1981), is authoritative 
\ 
precedent to the contrary. The Court of Appeals in that 
case found that the State had violated no clearly established 
due process right when it discharged a civil service employee 
without any pretermination hearing. 9 
Nor was it unreasonable· in this case, under Fourteenth 
Amendment due process principles, for the Department to 
conclude that appellee had been provided with the funda-
' mentals of due process. 10 As stated above, the District 
Court found that appellee was informed several times of the 
Department's objection to his second employment and took 
advantage of several opportunities to present his reasons for 
believing that he should be permitted to retain his part-time 
employment despite the contrary rules of the Patrol. Appel-
; 
'We see no reason to doubt, as does the dissent, that the Court of Ap-
peals in Weisbrod had full knowledge of its own precedents and correctly 
construed them. 
10 As the dissent explains at some length, the decisions of this Court by 
1978 had required "some kind of a hearing," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U. S. 564, 570 n. 7 (1972), prior to discharge of an employee who had a con-
stitutionally protected property interest in his employment. But the 
Court had not determined what kind of a hearing must be provided. Such 
a determination would require a careful balancing of the competing inter-
ests-of the employee and the State-implicated in the official decision at 
issue. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 q976). As the Court 
had considered circumstances in which no hearing at all had been provided 
prior to termination, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), or in which 
the requirements of due process were met, Board of Regents v. Roth, 
supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974); Bislwp v. Wood, 426 U . S. 
341 (1976); Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), there had been no occasion 
to specify any minimally acceptable procedures for termination of employ-
ment. The dissent cites no case establishing that appellee was entitled to 
more elaborate notice, or a more formal opportunity to respond, than he in 
fact received. 
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lee's statement of reasons and other relevant information 
were before the senior official who made the decision to dis-
charge appellee. And Florida law provided for a full eviden-
tiary hearing after termination. We conclude that the Dis-
trict Court correctly held that appellee has demonstrated no 
violation of his clea'riy established constitutional rights. 
B 
Appellee's second ground for affirmance in substance is 
that upon which the District Court relied. Appellee submits 
that appellants, by failing to comply with a clear state regula-
tion, forfeited their qualified immunity from suit for violation 
of federal constitutional rights. 
Appellee makes no claim that the appellants' violation of 
the state regulation either is itself actionable under§ 1983 or 
bears upon the claim of constitutional right that appellee as-
serts under§ 1983. 11 And appellee also recognizes that Har-
low v. Fitzgerald makes immunity available only to officials 
whose conduct conforms to a standard of "objective legal 
reasonableness." 457 U. S., at 819. Nonetheless, in appel-
lee's view, official conduct that contravenes a statute or regu-
lation is not "objectively reasonable" because officials fairly 
may be expected to conform their conduct to such legal 
norms. Appellee also argues that the lawfulness of official 
conduct under such a statute or regulation may be deter-
mined early in the lawsuit on motion for summary judgment. 
Appellee urges therefore that a defendant official's violation 
of a clear statute or regulation, although not itself the basis of 
suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from 
11 State law may bear upon a claim under the due process clause when the 
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created 
by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Appellee's 
property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee 
does not contend here that the procedural rules in state law govern the 
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damages for violation of other statutory or constitutional 
provisions. 
On its face, appellee's reasoning is not without some force. 
We decline, however, to adopt it. Even before Harlow, our 
cases had made clear that, under the "objective" component 
of the good faith immunity test, "an official would not be held 
liable in damages under§ 1983 unless the constitutional right 
he was alleged to have violated was 'clearly established' at the 
time of the violation." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 
498 (1978) (emphasis added); accord, Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). Officials sued for constitutional 
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely be-
cause their conduct violates some statutory or administrative 
provision. 12 
1.2 In Harlow, the Court aclrnowledged that officials may lose their immu-
nity by violating "clearly established statutory ... rights." 457 U. S., at 
818. This is the case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for vi-
olation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, see id. , at 820 n. 36, 
and as in many § 1983 suits, see, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U. S. 1 
(1980) (holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for 
violating federal statutes). For the reasons that we discuss , officials sued 
for violations of rights conferred by a statute or regulation, like officials 
sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by 
violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become 
liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the 
statutory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages. And if a 
statute or regulation does give rise to a cause of action for damages, clear 
violation of the statute or regulation forfeits immunity only with respect to 
damages caused by that violation. In the present case, as we have noted, 
there is no claim that the state regulation itself or the laws that authorized 
its promulgation create a cause of action for damages or provide the basis 
for an action brought under § 1983. 
Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our cases 
have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits 
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers 
under Bivens v. Six Unknawn Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971). See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504. Neither federal nor state 
officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or 
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We acknowledge of course that officials should conform 
their conduct to applicable statutes and regulations. For 
that reason, it is an appealing proposition that the violation of 
such provisions is a circumstance relevant to the official's 
claim of qualified immunity. But in determining what cir-
cumstances a court may consider in deciding claims of quali-
fied immunity, we choose "between the evils inevitable in any 
available alternative." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 
813-814. Appellee's submission, if adopted, would disrupt 
the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vin-
dication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' 
effective performance of their duties. The qualified immu-
nity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of 
harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate 
when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and 
only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. See Butz 
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506-507 (1978); Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U. S., at 814, 818-819. Yet, under appellee's 
submission, officials would be liable in indeterminate amount 
for violation of any constitutional right-one that was not 
clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time 
of the alleged violation-merely because their official conduct 
also violated some statute or regulation. And, in § 1983 
suits, the issue whether an official enjoyed qualified immu-
nity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a 
state administrative regulation, questions that federal judges 
often may be unable to resolve on summary judgment. 
Appellee proposes that his new rule for qualified immunity 
be limited by requiring that plaintiffs allege clear violation of 
a statute or regulation that advanced important interests or 
was designed to protect constitutional rights. Yet, once the 
door is opened to such inquiries, it is difficult to limit their 
scope in any principled manner. Federal judges would be 
granted large discretion to extract from various statutory 
regulatio~f federal or of state law-unless that statute or regulation 
provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon. 
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and administrative codes those provisions that seem to them 
sufficiently clear or important to warrant denial of qualified 
immunity. And such judgments fairly could be made only 
after an extensive inquiry into whether the official in the cir-
cumstances of his decision should have appreciated the ap-
plicability and importance of the rule at issue. It would be-
come more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate the 
possible legal consequences of their conduct, 13 but also for 
trial courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted 
litigation. 
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official 
compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money 
damages. Such officials as police officers or prison wardens, 
to say nothing of higher-level executive levels who enjoy only 
qualified immunity, routinely make close decisions in the ex-
ercise of the broad authority that necessarily is delegated to 
them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, 
"often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in 
such flux that officials can comply with them only selec-
tively." See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In 
these circumstances, officials should not err always on the 
side of caution. "[O]fficials with a broad range of duties and 
authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that 
action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication 
of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S., at 246. 14 
18 Officials would be required not only to know the applicable regulations, 
but also to understand the intent with which each regulation was adopted. 
Such an understanding often eludes even trained lawyers with full access 
to the relevant legislative or administrative materials. It is unfair and im-
practicable to require such an understanding of public officials generally. 
,. Appellee urges as well that appellants' violation of the personnel regu-
lation constituted breach of their ''ministerial" duty-established by the 
regulation-to follow various procedures before terminating appellee's em-
ployment. Although the decision to discharge an employee clearly is dis-
cretionary, appellee reasons that the Highway Patrol regulation deprived 
appellants of all discretion in determining what procedures were to be fol-
lowed prior to discharge. Under this view, the Harlow standard is inap-
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III 
A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitu-
tional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant offi-
cial's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights 
were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. 
As appellee has made no such showing, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
posite because this Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in 
the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions. 
Appellee's contention mistakes the scope of the ''ministerial duty" excep-
tion to qualified immunity in two respects. First, as we have discussed, 
breach of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation would forfeit of-
ficial immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the appellee's cause of 
action for damages. This principle equally applies whether the regulation 
created discretionary or ministerial duties. Even if the personnel regula-
tion did create a ministerial duty, appellee makes no claim that he is enti-
tled to damages simply because the regulation was violated. See pp. 8-10 
and note 11, supra. 
In any event, the rules that purportedly established appellants' "ministe-
rial" duties in the present case left to appellants a substantial measure of 
discretion. Cf. Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U. S. 136, 138 (1870); Kendall 
v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 87, 98 (1845). Appellants were to determine, for exam-
ple, what constituted a "complete investigation" and a ''thorough study of 
all information" sufficient to justify a decision to terminate appellee's em-
ployment. See note 6, supra. And the District Court's finding that ap-
pellants ignored a clear legal command does not bear on the ''ministerial" 
nature of appellants' duties. A law that fails to specify the precise action 
that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary au-
thority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is 
abused. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, supra. 
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Appellee, formerly an employee of the Florida 
Highway Patrol, brought this §1983 action against 
appellants, officers of the Patrol. Be alleged that 
appellants had discharged him/ without notice or hearing~as 
required by the due process clause. 
The present appeal presents only the questio,; 
whether appellants enjoy qualified immunity/ from suit for 
damages under the standard of "objective reasonableness• 
~~ 
enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, -4§7 u-.-s. 899 A.(1982). 
The District Court found that appellants had 
violated no clear1~4stablished constitutional rights~of 
appellee. Nonetheless, it held that appellants had 
~ their immunity/ because their conduct had violated 
an administrative regulation. The Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit affirmed without opinion. 
A §1983 plaintiff, seeking damages for an alleged 
violation of constitutional or statutory rights, must show 
that those rights were clearly establishe~at the time of 
the conduct at issue. This is the objective standard of 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. -
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lt is a rule that strikes a proper balanc~between 
1"\ 
society's interest in vindicating the constitutional rights 
of citizens,~and its interest in assuring that public 
officials are free to perform their dutie~thout 1 
l (;~_ 1-t,,.. · 
apprehension of being beld liable for action not in 'I' 
violation of then clearly established rights.) 
We agree with the courts below that appellants 
violated no clearly established constitutional or statutory 
v-<:-~ 
rights. ButAthey erred in then relying sol~!f on a state 
administrative regulation to impose liability. 
Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals,~and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with our opinon. 
Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion / in 
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens have joined. 
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